Military and Political Analysis of the 2006 Lebanon War 1

The recent Lebanon war reached a very rough stalemate (at the time of this writing) with Hezbollah still firmly entrenched in South Lebanon, with the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) holding pockets of a devastated South Lebanon. The IDF made several strategic errors in the planning of their military assault and its carrying out. First thing, Hezbollah was very firmly entrenched in fortified bunkers and complexes throughout the south of the country. They also employed almost a stealth-like technology in the form of strategically-employed camaflouge on themselves and their weaponry—including its missile batteries. Israel was unable to fully flush out many of the Hezbollah—who acted more like a Special Forces division than “militants” or “terrorists” that they were labeled as. Effectively, the IDF discounted them as a potent military force, adding to the grave errors and strategic miscalculations.

They were also armed like a Special Forces division with night-vision and sophisticated anti-tank missiles that took a heavy toll on the piecemeal forces that the IDF initially mustered. The Israeli main battle tank, the Merkava, became basically useless against these new missiles. Without enough heavy armor, these new weapons and the commando-like training and tactics that Hezbollah had, Israel faced a bloody stalemate that lasted throughout most of the war. Even when the IDF moved in much greater numbers towards the end of the war, they faced a determined, fanatical enemy that did not easily cede ground. (In the second Lebanon war, of 1982, the Merkava tank easily sliced through PLO and Syrian lines; there was no effective countermeasure against it).

Israel has to immediately upgrade the armor of their main battle tank, to reflect new weapons capable of disabling or destroying it. If the IDF does not, they could one day face several Syrian divisions armed with these weapons on the Golan Heights. Syria is already rapidly replacing a lot of their own tanks with more modern, better armored tanks. Syria and Iran are either rapidly replacing their weapons…or adding far more lethal ones. The IDF has acted way too complacent and, therefore, way too slow in modernizing its front-line weaponry.

Hezbollah fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Israeli corvette during the war, badly damaging it. An Israeli ship has not faced any significant damage since the Yom Kippur war. This does not bode well for the future, especially in the face of a looming confrontation between Iran and the US. The Syrian-Iranian axis could easily defend their shores, and the Iranians could cripple global shipping and nearby American naval assets. This means that Israeli warships, with basically the same defensive weapons as America’s navy, could easily be interdicted in any future Arab-Israeli conflict.

It has been argued, like the Yom Kippur war of 1973 where Israel recovered from the initial surprise attack by Syria and Egypt to deeply penetrate their territories, the IDF of the 21st century did the same thing. What? Excuse me! Israel came within a whisker of being overrun then. It was only because of a few tactical errors on behalf of Syria and Egypt that Israel was able to do what it did. But they were certainly in no military position to defeat Syria and Egypt then. It was just global pressure that finally ended the war; Syria and Egypt replacing their military losses through a Soviet airlift.

Hezbollah was not facing imminent defeat, weathering a profound IDF assault, and receiving arms shipments from Iran and Syria. Global pressure also helped to end this war—although time was taken to mount it because the West was determined to smash the Hezbollah infrastructure. Thinking, like the Israelis, that the war would end in a huge IDF victory. It became a public relations nightmare for Israel and the US as hundreds of civilians and a great deal of the Lebanese infrastructure fell under the relentless IDF assault—with Hezbollah still firmly entrenched in the south of the country.

Mounting international pressure caused basically a return to the situation before the war. With a facade of a deal: a toothless UNIFIL force and Lebanese army. Hezbollah will re-arm and re-equip its forces. If Hezbollah is pushed back somewhat from the border, it may end up being armed with advanced SCUD missiles and other long-range armament. Effectively, they could fire over the heads of the blue-helmet peacekeepers.

But, in my opinion, the front should stabilize for now. Syria and Iran have been deeply exposed as Hezbollah’s strategic partner. I believe both countries will urge restraint for now. Hezbollah also took heavy losses—and certainly is not indestructible. In a future war with Israel, they will certainly be overwhelmingly defeated because the IDF will adapt. A much more robust IDF armored force could lessen the impact of new anti-tank missiles. Hezbollah does not have sufficient numbers to stop a much larger force. Hundreds more tanks and more Special Forces units could easily trap the Hezbollah brigades, forcing a peace deal that would finally see the end of Hezbollah.

A future campaign will see the IDF use upwards to 60,000 troops. Hezbollah will no doubt inflict huge losses. But they will be exterminated. In any future war, Syrian bases of entry for arms shipments to Hezbollah will be attacked. Israel will have the justification under the violation of the UN agreement 1701. Perhaps, the IDF is looking with one eye to the future, one eye to the present in ratifying 1701.

A grave error that Hezbollah did make was the non-firing of its larger missiles and a more heavier responses with the thousands of its short-range missiles. A broader attack on Israel’s population base could have weakened the war effort against Hezbollah and forced an earlier end to the war. Additionally, Hezbollah erred in not having viable, circuitous routes from Syria. They did not anticipate the destruction of strategic bridges and roads. Also, they put up a poor performance in the shooting down of IDF helicopters and planes. Only one helicopter was brought down.

Hezbollah, who showed enormous skill in the damage of the Israeli corvette and the mastery of its short-range missiles, had no significant anti-aircraft defenses, which could have slowed the IDF’s destruction of critical supply routes. Also, they did not anticipate such a degree of destruction to these routes, by bringing in enough weapons and supplies beforehand.

Effectively, although they put up a good fight, showed themselves as being a weak, unprepared force. Who got lucky because Israel complacently underestimated them. The IDF relied too heavily on air power, instead of more armor and Special Forces. The irony of it being the air power did contribute to the war’s end by wounding, maiming and killing so many civilians.

I, like many others, share the opinion that this really was a war between the Syrian/Iranian axis and Israel: Hezbollah was the proxy. People have also argued that this was to take the heat off Iran over its nuclear ambitions. I don’t believe. Again, the West is underestimating these Mid-East powers. Iran fully expects a degree of ever escalating sanctions. This war, like everyone that has proceeded it, is really a test of weapons and tactics for the next one.

People have also spoken about ‘asymmetrical’ warfare, such as terrorism and other unconventional means of waging war in the Mid-East—especially from Iran. The terrible truth about it is that Iran, like Syria, has caught up with the West in many ways militarily. Syria and Iran did not intervene directly in the Lebanon war because they could have easily lit the fuse to a much larger conflict, before these powers are ready to initiate it.