Military and Political Analysis of the 2006 Lebanon War 2

As the dust continues to settle over the month-long bloody conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, already Israel and the West are hard at work in dissecting the war, as new war clouds are on the horizon with Iran over its nuclear program. The war, hopefully, has shaken Israel out of its complacency and force it to make some drastic changes. The first one that is desperately needed is a balanced integration between ground and air forces. When one part of the military is overwhelmingly used over another, it can lead to serious problems. Too little ground forces can cause a well-entrenched enemy to be able to inflict grave losses, and for most part, hold most of their territory.

If ground forces are overwhelmingly used, without a proper balance of air power, an enemy can inflict huge losses, and cause an offensive to lose steam. The IDF used too little ground forces—balancing it later with larger forces. By then it was way too late. Global pressure forced an end to the war. Had the IDF fully integrated its military forces in its offensive, using two armored divisions, at least two infantry divisions and several paratroops brigades—along with full-scale, massive air power—they would have reached the Litani River, effectively trapping the Hezbollah and their rocket corps.  However, only if that had happened within a week of the war, and was all used at once.

The IDF became a joke for the war. Round the clock air strikes, naval bombardment, infantry and armored charges by the IDF failed to stop what was basically no more than two divisions of enemy forces from firing thousands of rockets at Israel. Israeli cities were blasted on an hourl basis. Finally, the war reached a very tentative end. But at what cost? The strongest military in the Mid-East did not stop thousands of enemy rockets from raining down, and the release of their soldiers.

Hezbollah, after Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, went through advanced training and re-arming by Iran and Syria. Already battle-hardened from years of fighting the IDF, Hezbollah soon increased its strength and potency. By 2006, Hezbollah had already reached the strength of an army. Also, organized and structured like a national military. The regular Lebanese army, although larger, could not come close to the training, armaments and fanatical dedication of Hezbollah—and was certainly no match for them.

Years of civil war, occupations by Syria and Israel had left Lebanon with an embryonic democracy. The Lebanese government was in no position to challenge Hezbollah without the possibility of tearing Lebanon apart again. Although Syria had withdrawn after the “cedar revolution”, it still maintained puppet-like control over Lebanon, in part through Hezbollah. The seeds for a new war had already been planted by the strategic-axis of Iran and Syria.

Israel remained complacent, with the best military in the Mid-East. Like the pre-war climate before the 1973 Yom Kippur war, when Israel said: “Damascus was an hours drive away, Cairo perhaps two”—-Israel of the 21st century was similarly overconfident. Syria was referred to as a “poor” country that had an obsolete and aging military. A country that would dare not attack Israel without facing an overwhelming defeat. Iran was viewed as being way too far to pose a significant threat. Its nuclear threat would be dealt with long before it became a significant threat. The reality is that these two countries are much greater threat than ever realized. Hezbollah had the tactics, training and weapons of Iran and Syria.

We know that Iranian and Syrian weaponry has matched or exceeded some Israeli and Western weapons systems. But now tactics and training has exceeded some IDF tactics. This is very dangerous and does not bode well for the future of the IDF. Unlike the massed Syrian armored and infantry advances of the Yom Kippur war—that relied heavily upon an extremely sophisticated SAM (Surface-to Air Missile) system—the next war will see advanced missiles destroying hard IDF military assets. Such destruction could pave the way for Syrian and Iranian Special-Ops landing at strategic points in Israel. Sabotage could blow up bridges, roads and attack IDF . They could also seize military bases in Israel that holds Israel’s nuclear deterrence.

Israel has to immediately upgrade their defensive systems against missiles. The Syrian-Iranian axis probably already has effective countermeasures against the Arrow anti-missile system. A simple way of defeating it is just to flood it with hundreds upon hundreds of missiles (some armed, some not). The system will probably burn out very quickly—or at the very least, run out of defensive ordnance. Using the Patriot anti-missile system as a backup simply will not work. The system (used in the first Gulf War of 1991) contributed to the destruction in Israel. Besides, both systems were ineffective against Hezbollah missiles. Northern Israel burned while both systems stood quiet.

Iran, Syria and Hezbollah effectively neutralized a very sophisticated defensive system with low-tech, mostly battlefield missile systems. Thousands are homeless in Israel by a simple battlefield ordnance. The IDF has to catch up with these tactics—or face more of these and other types of attacks that could be far more devastating. New weapons that can counter these are years away from being deployed in Israel. The IDF is woefully behind some Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah strategies and tactics.

The Lebanon war was definitely a proxy war. For that reason, Iran and Syria restrained Hezbollah from firing the far more devastating weapons in its arsenal. Such an attack would definitely have dragged Syria and Iran in. Both countries, for now, were content to sit on the sidelines, evaluating the war. Fears of a Syrian-Iranian entry into the war were unfounded. However, Syria did mobilize its reserves, on the idea that Israel might strike some Syrian military assets. For now, Israel did little or nothing against Syria. A mistake that can only embolden Syria, Iran and Hezbollah.

Israel can defeat these new strategies, weapons and tactics.  But it’s going to take the political will to do it. If not, the proxy war in Lebanon is just the beginning of a far more devastating and bloodier conflict that will scar the human psyche for generations to come, much like World War II did.  Even with the apparent victory over Hamas in 2009 did not prove that the IDF is once again the legend of folklore that it once was.  Just that Hamas did not have the training and sophisticated weaponry that Hezbollah jas.  In time, like Hezbollah, they will learn, adapt and arm accordingly.