Solution to the US-Iran Nuclear Confrontation

As a scholar and an elite member of the intelligentsia, it is my honor to advise the new president of the United States on the subject of foreign policy. Our new president, Senator Barack Obama, faces an international community that is marked by chaotic ideologies and uncertainty and is it critical that the new administration develop a comprehensive foreign policy, especially with regard to the development of nuclear weapons by Iran. Thus, towards this end, I will present new perspectives and insights into the Iranian society and the impact the new administration’s policy could have in the region and the world. So it is critical for us to analyze the new possible foreign policy options regardless of the fact that Iran might or might not be developing a nuclear weapons system but it remains a large possibility that Iran is developing a weapon of mass destruction. But to understand the best methods of dealing with Iran, it is important for us to look back at what history can teach us and the conditions within the country to determine possible reactions to our policies. By looking our Iran’s internal structure, history of Iranian and US policies in the region and our history, we will be able to comprehensively approach our end goal solution to this dilemma – diplomatically or politically ending the Iranian nuclear program without military intervention – that is through negotiation. But then again, is ending the Iranian nuclear program the best solution to this issue?

Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, Iran has been facing constant isolation and economic stagnation as contact with western nations dwindled as did high level diplomatic contact. Thus after the Islamic revolution in Iran, the people of the country have not experienced any non-Islamic contact with the outside world. This is especially true for the younger generation that was born after the 1980s baby boom. It is interesting to note that 60% of all Iranian adult population is younger than 29.[1] But nevertheless, it is the young people of Iran that are most favorable towards the West. Almost 70% of the Iranian people believe that the West is technologically advanced and 29% of the people believe in the West people enjoy equal political rights. The majority of these people who believe this way are the Iranian youth (Ledeen pg. 47). So right away, we begin to see a young vibrant population that really sees the West in favorable terms. On college campuses, the pro-democracy movement is strong among the student population (Wright pg 258). It is important for the western nations to keep this in mind and possibly utilize on this young generation, for this is the generation that will lead Iran in the years to come. But how can we send the right message to the people without appearing aggressive or unable to hold our ground with Iran? That is the dilemma we face as a nation and it is one that we must address or be faced with increasing dislike in the Muslim world.

To understand why Iran seeks to pursue the nuclear research, we have to understand those in power and who exactly makes the decisions. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is headed by Saeed Jalili, who also occupies the post as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. The council is currently convinced that in order to prevent an attack or preventive intrusion by any regional or global power, it is essential for Iran to cross the threshold into a full fledged nuclear power. The symbolic act that represented this new policy shift within the council is marked by the replacement of the moderate Ali Larijani by the more radical Saeed Jalili. However, for us to equate all of the council to be in agreement with such a policy would also be a grave mistake that can possibly alienate some potential pro-western factions within the council (Moslem).

The council is made of many different political factions, groups and leaders – all fighting to gain the blessing of the Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader of the nation. Since the ayatollah is never wrong and is beyond reproach, it is within the council that the war over a specific policy is fought and it is the same council that takes the heat for any failed policies. Decisions of the Supreme National Security Council is made through consensus rather than a decree by the council leader or the ayatollah, this which ever ideology or policy has the most factional support becomes the national agenda. Iranian President Ahmadinejad and his radical and more conservative political faction strives to rekindle the revolutionary spirit both at home and in the greater Middle East, and one way is to adopt a stringent defensive policy that projects an strong front (Beehner pt 9). Thus the nuclear program became the idea of the administration to gain international leverage and as a guarantee of security through nuclear deterrence.

Beneath the surface of this seemly radical government, there is a large lack of coordination, disagreement between factions and governmental branches and a schism over the future of Iran. The Iranian parliament known as the Majlis often criticizes the President over his “hate speech,” or certain stances of the President that are too “confrontational” both at home and abroad.  It is within the Majlis that more reformist and modern voices of Iranian people are voiced; however the parliament is checked by the Ayatollah, the expanded power of the executive and numerous other hardliners within the various councils.  Another progressive arm of the government is the Iranian Foreign Ministry where more reformist bureaucrats are in charge; however their power is also checked by the hardliners in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. So it does not help when the Foreign Ministry presents the Iranian nuclear program as a peaceful program for energy purposes to the international community while President Ahmadinejad calls for the state of Israel to be “wiped off the map.” Thus it is important for the West to be aware of this internal conflict of ideas, factions, political espionage and the internal power struggles when dealing with Iran. By creating situations that gives leverage for the more moderate and reformist voices to be heard in the various councils is one valuable and certainly an essential method that the West must make use of if they have any hopes for any future policy shifts.

In the Middle East, one can argue that every single problem that we face is has Iranian hand or influence behind it in some way. Thus, Iran still offers the possibility of being an important catalyst for a reformed Middle East in a post-Iraq war world. But the rhetoric and the silence in the diplomatic channels coming from both nations (US and Iran) and Iran’s sponsoring of anti-Israeli terrorists are now playing a disruptive role in the region. Both countries do not know how to use the post-Saddam era to advance their causes and build a stronger relationship with each other. America has removed the primary reason Iran used to advance its nuclear cause – which was the threat of Iraq under Saddam. So the question remains, why does a country rich in fossil fuels require the need of a nuclear power plant? This same question was raised by the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and is now voiced by the Bush administration. Currently, the two biggest actors involved in the Middle East politics are Iran and the United States.

In many ways, one can argue that the current situation with Iran has reached the level it is at due to gross negligence by the U.S. and seriously flawed unilateral initiatives launched by various administrations. One such popular notion of many Islamic nations is the belief that there is an unfair application of international law when it comes to Muslim or Arab nations.  This has played directly into Iran’s hand in providing the nation with political and national legitimacy in some international circles to continue its nuclear research program. Numerous examples cited by the Iranians include the state of Israel which is an undeclared nuclear power, the trade of research materials to India by US and Canada, the French reactor that was sold to Iraq and Russians giving away nuclear assistance to any nation that asks. They go even further to say that the IAEA does not act on Israel due to the US blocking such action and this gives way to a notion that Israel is above the international law. Until the US can successfully change this perception that it is somehow bankrolling Israel politically, diplomatically, financially and militarily, there will still be mistrust and a hatred of the United States in the Middle East – a notion that is thrilling news to Iran. During late 2004, when France, Germany and the UK negotiated with Iran on behalf of the EU, the deal that was reached was portrayed by Iran as Europe slowly drifting away from US policies and influence (David pg 7). In many ways, the US refusal to negotiate with Iran and the hardliner policy positions taken by the administration has created a sense of frustration in the US-European relations and was used by Iran to widely discredit US policy initiatives elsewhere in the world. Thus there is a widely held negative view of US foreign policies in Europe and the rest of the world. So when the United States finally agreed to even consider alternatives approaches about the Iranian nuclear program, there was an unstated response from the EU – something along the lines of “this is what we have been telling you all along.” Nevertheless, as much as our past mistakes have damaged our international reputation and reduced our diplomatic and political resources needed to curb or stop the Iranian nuclear program, it has opened a whole new array of opportunities for the United States to be more involved in the world affairs multilaterally instead of the unilateral approach we are so accustomed to.

For a nation that is clearly the world’s largest superpower, it is surprising that it does not know how to use its “soft power.” Many times the US is often too quick to act unilaterally or use excessive military force to accomplish a task that could have been achieved through diplomatic and multilateral engagements. Even looking in Washington DC, we can see that diplomacy has taken a backseat in our nation’s policy making process. The defense department has the largest budget in the world and has a grand building known as the Pentagon to house it, while the state department is housed in an office-styled building with no visible signs to set it apart from a regular office complex – reflecting of its stature and budget in shaping US foreign policy. In fact, the United States has relied so often on its military to protect its national interest and to achieve its goals that the world has come to expect nothing short of a military response from the US – a  reason why Iran firmly believes that it can only deter a conventional attack from the US or Israel through nuclear deterrence. So to approach Iran with serious efforts to diplomatically resolve the nuclear crisis would be least expected and would give credence to our ailing “soft power” influences in the world. Many times negotiation has been portrayed as ineffective and resource-consuming so the idea itself has a negative annotation. However, as anyone with common sense can tell you, Iran is a unique case that can only be dealt through negotiation. Military action or any action sponsored by the US to directly topple the current regime would in essence create strong regional resentment of the United States and will give a revived vigor to Islamic terrorism that is already on the rise in the region. Even the US Air Force agrees that aerial bombing a nation’s military infrastructure does not always get the best results, so you need “boots on the ground” to take any decisive military action in Iran. The way the US is currently engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would not be an easy task for the United States to comfortable handle three simultaneous wars in three unique terrains, cultures and regions (Calabresi). Not just the financial aspect of any such rash action, but the number of youths in Iran (60% of the population) who supported Western values will quickly evaporate as ideologies of pan-Islamic unity, nationalism and cultural pride plays a role in turning the civilian population into opposing the “invader(s)” and the subsequent rise of terrorism that will try to take advantage of the power vacuum created by a weakened Iranian government. So we can clearly rule out any possibility of military action or any direct action to topple the Iranian government because it will become nothing short of a mess (Zuckerman). Thus to indirectly attempt to bring down the government is another option. By funding groups such as People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) (Mujahedin-e Khalq), a student created opposition group against the Shah and now the Tehran government, the US can attempt to influence a regime change but that may backfire with increased hostility from Iran (an example of this is in the Bay of Pigs incident). The US has been wary of sponsoring or using non-state actors as history shows that it has always come back to haunt us. Thus the only viable option is to directly engage with Iran to bring about a peaceful resolution.

With an Iran that is firmly convinced that it needs to complete its nuclear program and get to a stage where it can generate nuclear power or weapons of mass destruction, it is tough to implement a diplomatic resolution. Since our ties to the European community have been damaged and our diplomatic power weakened, it is critical for us to engage multilaterally (Burkholder). Approaching Iran multilaterally gives us an opportunity to restore some damaged relations with the European community. Both Europe and the US wants the same thing, they do not want to see Iran with nuclear power but recently, has been in strong disagreement as to how exactly both parties should proceed to solve the problem. The more hardliner US policy was sanctions and isolation of Iran from the international community while the EU has been engaging Iran in multilateral and bilateral talks. And even within the EU, there have been disagreements on to how to specifically deal with Iran and instances where countries engaged in separate negotiations with Iran outside of the EU on a wide array of issues. And clearly, there has been no global initiative to address the Iranian nuclear viability. Currently the US does not have enough political and diplomatic capital or influence for any unilateral action and the EU does not have the unity and the desired military strength to back up any threats or agreements. Thus the best option for the EU and the US would be to work together for both parties. Since the EU has better diplomatic experience and influence, the EU should be given an important role to play in any negotiation with Iran. This would be in the best interest of the US in order to help heal come of the credibility issues that has risen about US conduct in the world and secure stronger European relations with the US in the future. Thus placing the EU in the forefront and backing up the EU with the necessary financial, political and diplomatic influences and the possible threat of a strong military action helps to place more authority at the negotiation table that is favorable to the West. The US also can act as a unifying force within the EU and if it plays its cards right, the US can emerge as a respected leader in the diplomatic world.

Negotiation with Iran will be a slow process and often will involve the West offering a lot of incentives to Iran to abandon their nuclear research. The process of negotiation involves an “all of the above” approach, meaning if diplomacy does not work, then economic and military consequences of drastic measures will be implemented against Iran. That is the message that needs to be send with any negotiation processes and to do that, all negotiating parties must be serious about it and the international community (or at least the Western and world powers) must present a unified front. However, how far will any EU-US negotiation team get without some serious cooperation from the Russian Federation and China? Both Russia and China has heavily vested interests in Iranian oil and many countries in Europe have numerous bilateral trade treaties and oil interests in Iran. Thus any talks with Iran must include Russia and China as parties along with the EU and US representatives and modeled much like the Six-Party talks held with North Korea. However, unlike North Korea, we must shift what we negotiate about. To try to stop Iran from getting nuclear weapons is foolish and would simply waste our diplomatic resources. There are not enough incentives and “carrot and stick” approaches that we can offer Iran in order to stop their program (Fukuyama pg. xxii). A tougher measure of sanctions on Iran is not possible when Russia and China has millions of dollars invested in developing Iranian nuclear research, Iranian oil production and other trade deals. So any sanctions through the UN would fail and the EU and U.S. will only be able to enforce a restricted multilateral sanction. It would not be effective as Iran still has numerous trading partners. So what else can we offer Iran? Full diplomatic recognition and the promise a conventional attack on Iran unless they halt their program is also useless – when Iran crosses the threshold into a full fledged nuclear power, it would be automatically get some sort of recognition and respect and the threat of conventional attack becomes totally useless. Iran has already made it clear they do not and will not halt its nuclear program and they view their nuclear program with nationalistic, economic and prestigious implications. For Iran, the nuclear project is a testament to how strong Iran is and how it is willing to shed the status of a 3rd world nation and join the all exclusive nuclear club. The project also would create numerous jobs in Iran and free up substantial amount of oil within Iran for international trade – an appealing idea to a country that is starving for money and faced with economic stagnation if not a recession. So to offer a deal that can effectively halt the Iranian program would be difficult and not feasible – Iran is in a strong position on this issue. Thus the best solution to the program is to simply let Iran develop its nuclear research program for “peaceful purposes” and if they develop weapons of mass destruction, then so be it.

Iranian leadership has relied heavily on propaganda against the West and has purposely acted outrageously in the international community to deflect domestic criticisms of the government and to silence the reformist voices in the country. When western powers or global powers react aggressively with Iran, it just arms Iranian leadership with more political and religious ammo to stay in power. In many sense, the Iranian radically heavily rely on a rash US, EU or Israeli reaction to their outburst and actions to continue beating the drums to remain a “model for the revolution.” So by simply allowing Iran to continue their program without objections would in essence disarm the current political faction in power. The factional world of Iranian politics and the extremely large majority of the population that supports the West would both play its part in severely restricting foolish actions by the current administration. Unlike a non-state actor, Iran is a country and even if they managed to get nuclear weapons, the concept of nuclear deterrence that they so heavily rely on for protection, will play a dual role in limiting their ambitions and ensure no nuclear attacks occurs. Since Iran is a state actor, it is easier to control and to ensure nuclear safeguards and there are certain interests and assets that the people and the state will not be willing to sacrifice, and thus will help preserve international peace. Thus it would be a mistake to assume Iran to be a “rogue nation” and that they are led by witless Islamic fanatics who want to blow up the world but don’t get me wrong, there are elements within the government that are like that (Ledeen pg. 137). The popular notion demonizes Iran and plays on unfounded fears that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, the terrorists will subsequently be equipped with nuclear devises and the world would be that much closer apocalypse. In some sense, what Iran needs is not further isolation and sanctions – as both have shown to be unsuccessful (Mafinezam pg. 126). Iran needs to be included into the international community and given the proper recognition diplomatically by world powers (especially the US). Further inclusion into the international community will help Iran to play a more positive role regionally and in the future, as a nuclear power. Currently, Iran is much like a child seeking attention because no one wants to be friends with him. So by including that “child” in a group, giving him acceptance for who he is and being helpful would play a critical role in helping to make sure that child’s behavior is amended to the level that is expected of by his group. This is the same story with Iran. Opening up the nation to the world and making it have heavier stakes in ensuring a peaceful region and a peaceful country would modify Iranian behavior in the region to a more constructive role. So the role of negotiations would be to ensure that there are proper oversights in the Iranian nuclear program through the IAEA or other international organization while allowing them to continue their program. This would be widely accepted by many of the EU, Russian and Chinese countries and Iran would more likely be willing to take this route. With proper oversight, heavier international involvement in Iranian trade and positive engagement of Iran by the international community will help to provide pressure on Iran to continue a peaceful nuclear program without the need to pursue a weapons research program. And by allowing their program to continue, the current administration becomes more susceptible to internal criticism by the Iranian parliament, foreign ministry and the reformists within the various councils including the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). With Iranian election coming up during the summer of 2009, such a decision by the US and the international community would come at the best time to make the current administration’s case for reelection totally obsolete. Such a decision would also force the Ayatollah to respond favorably to the West for allowing a program of great national and religious prestige to continue unhindered. The Ayatollah would be forced to respond this way due to the heavily propaganda that Iran presented to legitimatize the need for an expensive nuclear program in a country with starving people and high rate of unemployment and if the Ayatollah does not respond favorably, then he will appear even more hypocritical and it would still be a win-win situation for the West. A positive response by Ayatollah can also effectively end political squabbles arguing for Iran to take a more Islamic, conservative and aggressive policy against the West, enabling the young vibrant population to once again demand for greater freedoms and the more liberal, moderate and reformist individuals to take power in the various offices and councils. Many nations in the world will not have a problem with this and such a decision will have far reaching benefits to the US. The Iranian tie with Venezuela can weaken by such a friendly US gesture and will win more “hearts and minds” in the Middle East. One major problem to this solution can be seen by what reaction Israel would have to such a solution (Inskeep). When it comes down to it, the US would have to have Iran and Israel sit down and force both of them to sign treaties as well as engage both nations to sign NPT and allow IAEA to inspect their programs. Such a measure is needed to restore confidence in the US in the Middle East and to prevent neighboring Arab states from seeking a nuclear program of their own to counterbalance any Iranian programs. The biggest threat for the Arabs and Iran is a nuclear Israel and if Iran goes nuclear, then the rest of the Middle East states will want to go nuclear also. So the only limiting factor to stop the spread of nuclear states would be to have Iran and Israel committed to inspects, limitations and a multilateral framework in monitoring their nuclear programs. During the negotiation phase with Iran, the US must pressure to keep Israel from engaging Iranian nuclear facilities militarily or the whole thing will fall apart and eventually, the US would still be blamed for the Israeli attack and then it becomes a downward spiral from there.

For the US to restore its credibility and to develop its diplomatic influence, it must engage Iran diplomatically in cooperation with the European Union, Russia, China and Israel. By allowing the determined Iran to continue its program, while placing checks such as IAEA inspections, the US can improve its image in the Middle East because the US is seen as favoring Israel and remaining silent on their nuclear program while keeping Arabs and Islamic nations from getting nuclear power. The US can ultimately, through cause and effect, influence a regime change within Iran as the anti-U.S. propaganda and the current administration’s hateful rhetoric would turn out to be nothing more than baseless facts and foolish assumptions. Even though there will be a lot of opposition from Israel, the US will be able to successfully engage Iran and Israel to enter into constructive agreements and push Israel to drop their nuclear secrecy. Iran and Israel has long shared a common history and outside of Israel, the largest Jewish population in the Middle East can be found in Iran. Engaging Iran in international trade, laws, agreements and diplomatic ties as well as proper recognition, the risk of Iran engaging in radically destructive behavior is drastically reduced. In fact, it offers Iran with greater stake in acting more responsibly in the region and to play a constructive role in the global community. As a state actor, Iran has assets and interests that it will seek to protect and possess, thus making it easier for the international community to regulate Iranian behavior regardless of whether they have nuclear capability. Even if Iran develops a weapons program, nuclear deterrence will prevent Iran from making use of their arsenal (Fukuyama pg. xxv). By endowing Iran with greater responsibility in the region, Iran will be forced to reconsider their support of groups that cause regional instability and chaos for the sake of their self-interest to prosper. There are simply a lot of factors in this issue that cannot be controlled or predicted by any nation, but the only option that is viable is to allow the Iranian nuclear program with certain restrictions, responsibilities and incentives. Nothing short of that will stop the Iranian nuclear program or prevent a more chaotic and unstable Middle East from forming. This also is the best option for the US to address the Iranian issue and restore its credibility and image abroad. As President, Senator Barack Obama will be faced with numerous obstacles and will have a challenging task of employing this solution. However with persistence, patience, diplomacy and multilateral cooperation, the United States can ensure the world remains a safer place and the Middle East a more stable region with Iran playing a more positive and constructive role in the region.

[1] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2535127.stm

Work Cited Page

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