Human Rights Report: Somalia

The subject of human rights in the international system is still a relatively new phenomenon, but one that is in dire need of undivided attention.  In specificity, the occurrence of human rights violations requires attention and solution.  Although there are countless cases of equally disastrous violations, Somalia maintains the spotlight for the purpose of this discussion.  The turmoil and destruction that occurs from the lack of a central government includes a wide range of different characteristics.  Sexual abuse and assault within minority communities and refugee camps, clan violence, and IDP camp discrepancies are pervasive within Somalia.  The implementation of firstly, humanitarian aid, secondly, pressure to conform back to African ideals, and thirdly, a militarily structuralized influence from the United States and the African Union would counteract the human rights violations and lack of a central government present in Somalia. 

Human rights conditions consist in a number of different forms such as, civil and political rights, security rights, and subsistence rights.  The violations of these are apparent throughout Somalia and the surrounding areas.  The explanation of the onset of the violence and conflict in Somalia is crucial in order to understand the human rights avenue of discussion.  Somali politics since their independence have revolved around a few major clans, such as the Darod and Hawiye clans.  The Darod clan itself has numerous sub-clans within it.  The origination of the civil and political unrest in Somalia occurred in mid-1988 when the Somali National Movement started fighting Mohammed Siad Barre’s governmental regime in the northern part of the country.  While this was occurring, the Somali government faced intense economic and military resistance from the United Somali Congress in the central territory of the country.  As stated by John Prendergast, “…Somalia has always projected the image of itself as a united country with one ethnic group, one language, and one religion…But after years of Barre’s…tactics, these groupings are exploding in his face” (2).  Simply put, the beginning causes of the crisis were the accounts of fighting between the heavily armed clan-based forces of the “war-lords.”  The fighting between insurgents and the Somali and Ethiopian troops who support the transitional government is vital to note in a sense because the transitional government could be the answer to bringing peace and democracy to this failed state.  The destruction of complete areas of Somalia occurred with direct correlation to the humanitarian crises that followed. 

Human rights violations run rampant within Somalia in an overwhelmingly negative sense.  Clan militias instigated the beginnings of clan violence which, in turn, prompted humanitarian effects.  The occurrence of brutality forces Somalis to evacuate their communities as a last ditch attempt to survive.  A rough estimate of 300,000 Somali refugees fled to Kenya in the span of approximately a year and a half (Nowjoree, 44).  The first form of human rights violations resurrects itself as a result of this.  Sexual abuse and assault rage drastically within the displacement camps and the minority communities surrounding the clan headquarters.  Women and children are the unfortunate targets of this abuse and are often found to have fled Somalia just to find themselves faced with the same violence in Kenya.  Somali refugee women and girls are violently attacked by unknown armed bandits during the night or when they go to the outskirts of the camps to herd and/or collect firewood.  According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 192 cases of rape within the camps were documented over a 6 month period in 1993, while the undocumented number is believed to be as much as 10 times higher (Nowjoree, 44).  On a much lesser scale, the attacks have been known to occur from Kenyan police officers as well.  The sense of security in these displacement camps is non-existent yet of utter importance.  Aid has been given by the United States to the Kenyan government to counter the issue of security near the Somali-Kenyan border but little to none of this aid has been specifically allocated in the proper manner (Nowjoree, 44).  The problem of sexual abuse and assault of refugee women must be attended to by the Kenyan government, the relief community, and international donors in a rigorous and unrelenting approach in order to provide ample protection and assistance to these women and refugees in general. 

Another destruction of these basic human rights occurred during the major famine produced in Somalia throughout the years of 1991 and 1992.  Somalia has always tended to be the victim of famine most commonly as a result of drought.  An article stated that the most vulnerable victims during this famine were “specifically targeted because of their weakness and vulnerability, because of clan, or sub-clan affiliation, and/or because of valuable farmland coveted by other clans that intensified during the civil war” (Prendergast, 4).  The famine that threatened Mogadishu at that time was drastically different in origination and cause.  The complex food system in the area was indefinitely disrupted during the crisis and affected not only the farming areas and people, but the vast majority of Somalis in all surrounding areas.  The war has caused numerous types of casualties as a result, one of which being the lack of subsequent information on the extent of the famine.  It is also stated that the conditions among the farming populations as opposed to the pastoral populations are of extreme superiority and severity, but that the group in most dire circumstances are those who are displaced along different cites in the country (Africa Watch, 1992).  As a result of this armed conflict throughout the entire country, the number of displaced individuals has risen currently to over a million people since the start of this violence.  When the army is in control of the food and water supply, it is worrisome as to what groups of people will receive their adequate amount.  If the clan divisions are so high and there are disagreements on clan loyalty, then the army will most definitely ration the food and water strictly. 

The significance of any humanitarian crisis is relatively easy to understand, but there are implications of each individual case that reflect other issues in the international community.  From a standpoint of the cause and effects perceived towards the United States, Somalia produces a number of different characteristics.  Firstly, the foreign policy of the United States directly correlates with humanitarian crises that happen internationally.  In the case of Somalia, the United States involvement in either a positive or negative manner influences the representation of foreign policy.  Although the United States’ attempt at securitizing the delivery of food based aid during the famine in 1992 was a significant step in the right direction, the security was abruptly halted when the United States forces were violently met with insurgent groups who disagreed with their presence.  As one author reiterates, “in Somalia, what began…as a humanitarian intervention…turned into counter-insurgency, as the United States and UN became embroiled in clan politics in the absence of a government structure” (Miller, 8).  American lives were taken during this incident so, understandably, the security efforts were halted and ultimately withdrawn.  An attempted air strike on insurgent forces in 2007 by the United States was quickly seen as a failed endeavor as well when it was discovered that Somali civilians were killed in the process further exemplifying the issue at hand and negatively reflecting the foreign policy between the United States and its’ influence in Somalia.  The problem with this and, in the end, what made this occurrence reflect negatively on United States foreign policy was the lack of a proper follow-up once there was a realization that the end to the crisis in Somalia was not in sight. 

Secondly, as a result of the United States pulling their involvement out of Somalia, further international humanitarian crises were affected.  The United States was wary and highly cautious to implement their troops and resources into other situations that would produce an end result such like Somalia’s.  As in the Somali case, insurgent groups dragged American bodies through the streets and, in brutal showcases, made it apparent that the United States and, for that matter, the United Nations forces were not welcome.  As a result of this brutality, the United States withdrew their troops and left approximately 19,000 United Nations troops there.  This decision affected further interventions into humanitarian issues by the United States in such cases as the genocide in Rwanda.  The Clinton administration’s refusal to respond to Rwanda was due in large part to the United States’ retreat from Somalia after 18 deaths of United States army personnel (Clarke and Herbst 1996).  Miller states that “the televised pictures of a US raid gone wrong…hardened public opinion against using American forces…in a far-away place…” (627).  Although it proves to be inconclusive, it could perhaps indicate that the United States used its refusal, or better yet its hesitance, to respond as either a fear response or a tactic to preserve their resources. 

Another, but not nearly the last, characteristically significant aspect of the humanitarian crisis within Somalia is simply the violations of subsistence, civil, and political rights according to the international human rights regime.  Subsistence rights encompass the basic human needs of a person, like food, water, shelter, etc.  The violation of these subsistence rights is overwhelmingly apparent in the case of Somalia generally and more specifically during the crisis of the famine in 1992.  As Article 11 states in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, there is a right for everyone “to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions” (UN General Assembly, 1966).  The humanitarian situation in Somalia denies one of each of these rights, especially within the IDP camps.  The civil and political rights include the rights to life, liberty and the freedom of expression.  The violations in Somalia directly indicate the refusal of these rights because the civilians are not able to demonstrate freedom of expression for fear of violent response by the insurgent groups.  According to Article 9 in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “everyone has the right to liberty and security of person…no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law” (UN General Assembly, 1966).  In addition, Somalis are unable to participate in their own government and provide a voice for the sole reason that a stable and working government in Somalia remains to be presented.  If there is a lack of a present governmental system and set of laws, difficulty arises in the implementation of the different international covenants as significant as they happen to be. 

The presence of repression has already been made apparent in the case of Somalia, but there is a rather beneficial explanation available as well.  The Strength/Threat Model introduced by Stephen Poe works in correlation to the amount of repression being used by the state in question.  The Strength/Threat Model incorporates two key factors in its explanation.  An individual state’s ability to repress is the first and foremost factor to bring into consideration followed by the “menu of choices” or selection that the state is faced with.  According to Stephen Poe, there are four possible ways that variables of the Strength/Threat Model are incorporated into regimes.  These include: “1) because they increase/decrease levels of Threat perceived by decision makers, 2) because they increase/decrease leaders perceptions of Strength, 3) affecting kinds of opportunities available to decision makers who act in response to Strength/Threat ratio, and 4) affecting alarm of leaders willingness to adopt option of repression” (23).  In other words, the Strength/Threat Model incorporates the perceived threat to a state internally with the perceived strength that particular state has to deal with it.  Integrating the Strength/Threat Model into the case of humanitarian and governmental crisis within Somalia is quite simple.  The violent insurgent groups and the outside international communities both view a significant amount of threat within the state, but perhaps in opposite forms.  The insurgent groups view each other as a threat as well as viewing the aid given by the international community as an additional factor of the threat.  The international community views the threat being the insurgent groups themselves as well as the depletion of the communities’ supplies, resources and, ultimately, soldiers.  The perceived strength by the insurgent groups is high, but the actual strength is arguable considering their lack of trust and their disagreements on how to run the country.  The strength of the international community is great and it would seem to be advantageous for international actors to use that strength and power to counteract the tainted strength and power of the insurgent groups. 

The roots of the repression discussed above begin with a number of different characteristics, but for the purposes of this discussion, two significant factors, the lack of a central government and the overwhelmingly negative division of different clans, seem pertinent to the situation in Somalia as a whole.  First and foremost, the lack of a central government is the biggest factor in the preparatory implication of the crisis in Somalia.  There is no central power and legal system to regulate the issues occurring towards the civilians.  As has been stated above, there have been numerous attempts at establishing a form of new government in Somalia but all have failed.  The current Transitional Federal Government is facing numerous obstacles and crises and has dealt with Somalia itself as well as the forces of Ethiopia pushing into them.  The root of this comes from President Siad Barre’s fleeing of the country in 1991 and leaving Somalia in the hands of clan-based militia groups who, in no way, shape, or form, trusted one another. 

The second root of repression shown for the purposes of this discussion is the overwhelmingly negative division between different clans.  Simply stated, within Somalia the conflict is apparent from the types of family clans.  The clans produce violence when they believe that one clan name is trying to take over in whole, such as from a governmental standpoint.  The violence evolved from a clan attempting an overthrow of another central clan name.  The two major clans seem to be the Hawiye and the Darod clan.  The current president, Yusuf, is accused overwhelmingly of favoring his clan, Darod, when appointing governmental officials and therefore the Hawiye clan members, as well as other smaller clans, rebel against the Transitional Federal Government and President Yusuf (Mwakugu, 2007).  The problem arises because whether or not Somalia can fight to retain one, solid, stable form of government, the likelihood of all Somalis to file behind one specific leader outside of their clan position is very slim. 

The amount of strength actors in the international community have cycles into the proposed course of action that has been brainstormed for the situation in Somalia.  The proposed course of action or the various forms of access points, which can be targeted to counteract the crisis in Somalia, are somewhat three-fold.  First and foremost, the humanitarian crisis needs to be aided in order to work to fix the overall situation in Somalia.  The international community is the most capable to send aid to Somalia.  For these purposes, the United States would seem like the most likely candidate for foreign aid to Somalia because of their abundance of power, economic resources, and strength. As another article by John Prendergast implies, “because of its role as the largest supplier of military aid to the regime over the last decade, the U.S. government bears a historic responsibility to take the lead in caring for the victims…” (2).  The attempt by the United States to provide security for the delivery of food in 1993 ultimately backfired with the violent response created by the insurgent groups and, consequently, the withdrawal that followed.  In stating that, it is clear that the United States has attempted forms of aid in Somalia previously, but bluntly speaking, they need to try again.  By integrating the United States resources and the United Nations’ resources, aid could and should be given in great amounts to Somalia and specifically to the individuals that are in the IDP camps.  The vast majority, as has been stated, of human rights issues in the country are now incorporated into the discrepancies within the IDP camps and their lack of proper resources and security to provide the civilians living within them. 

The second aspect of a proposed solution within the turmoil in Somalia is the integration of severe peace talks and negotiations that stem from basic and concrete African roots and ideals.  The aid is needed just as much as ever, but this time the United States should work alongside the United Nations and the African Union to ensure proper delivery and, ultimately, proper safety of the troops involved.  The issue in Somalia boils down to be an issue of African proportions.  The implementation of Western ideals would not be advantageous to work towards.  Thus, the cooperation of the African Union is essential in maintaining Somalia’s roots.   As with the vast majority of sub-Saharan African countries, the economic prosperity of the people remains peasant-like.  The problem with this is that people development from their economic and political setup (Ayittey, 1994).  In the case of Somalia, these two ideals are tainted by famine, lack of a centralized government, and civil war.  The sense of urgency in Somalia has been apparent for years now, but the solution is still a largely gray area.  In other words, a level of stability, peace, order, and respect for civil liberties is utterly necessary for a country to produce productive activity, i.e. stable government and security for all people in Somalia. 

A third and final, proposed solution to instigate change in the country of Somalia is to circulate a militarily structuralized intervention by the United States and the African Union.  Considering the implications that have occurred as a result of the violent insurgent groups, it seems pertinent that any sort of intervention done from a military standpoint should be stressed to remain as non-violent as possible.  Incorporating the resources from the United States military with the resources from the troops of the United Nations, a proper intervention can be implemented.  “Thought should be given to placing small detachments of international forces outside the major towns in areas judged to be most vulnerable to raids and attacks from the militia forces” (Prendergast, 5).  In such terms, the process of peacemaking instead of peacekeeping would be more beneficial in this situation.  Peacemaking works for the long term peace and goodwill of all as well as being a vision that understands the importance of ultimate needs being established for the security of all.  Since the African Union is already integrated in Somalia, the United States and the United Nations will, two-fold, be a security and supplemental tactic used to ensure the outcome needed to achieve ending goals of progress in Somalia. 

The complexity of a humanitarian crisis, such as in the case of Somalia, remains one in which numerous factors could have a positive or negative effect on it.  Famine, civil war, sexual abuse and assault, as well as many other characteristics make up the over-abundance of human rights violations in Somalia.  These violations stem from the destruction of the governmental system of the state, as well as the disillusioned mistrust between the various clan leaders and members.  Although a solution is hard to envision for the future of Somalia, there are ways the international community can take small steps to achieve a desirable outcome.  These include, but are not limited to, the execution of firstly, humanitarian aid, secondly, demands to conform back to African principles, and thirdly, a militarily structuralized intervention from the United States and the African Union to counteract the human rights abuses and lack of a central government present in Somalia.  In the long run, the benefits of aiding this state of turmoil in Somalia coincide with having positive consequences for those actors involved, such as the United States, the United Nations, and the African Union.